Decisions must be justified.
Introduction
In writing, '... the problem of ultimate justification is no more of a problem for utilitarianism (and no less) than it is for any other moral theory', Raanan Gillon (1) acknowledges a problem which, actually, is not often faced in moral philosophy or elsewhere. Perhaps, although this would be philosophical cowardice, the 'problem of ultimate justification' is too daunting. But, surely, 'critical evaluation of assumptions and arguments' (2) must lead us to look at ultimate justification.
It is important not to overlook the force of the adjective ultimate, for sceptical doubt drives us to 'the limits of justification and beyond' (3) . Now, one reaction to sceptical questionings is a philosophical stamp of the foot, like Phillips (4) saying (in another context), 'Sometimes, the insistence on asking further questions is not a sign of commendable intellectual persistence, but of stubbornness and stupidity; a failure to recognize when enough is enough'.
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In this paper I shall discuss the problem of ultimate justification. Clearly, it is unlikely that the problem will be dealt with in a manner sufficient to satisfy a professional philosopher as it is entangled in a morass of wider philosophical problems. A broader philosophical view, which has certainly helped to clarify some of my thoughts, may be found in Paul Johnston's Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy (5) . Any illumination given here is likely to be that of a spark rather than of a torch. My intention is to raise the issue of ultimate justification in the context of medical ethics and to suggest it sheds light on 'assumptions and arguments' which govern our decisions and actions.
The problem To 'justify' means to 'adduce adequate grounds' (6) . In medicine we frequently must give grounds for our action to patients or to colleagues. Infrequently we may have to justify our actions in open court. Daily, meanwhile, we acquire facility at giving grounds to ourselves for our decisions. It becomes easy to justify withholding antibiotics from an elderly stroke victim with pneumonia, or to justify sterilising a woman whose social circumstances or intelligence are poor, or to justify breaking confidentiality one day and withholding a diagnosis from a patient the next. I mean we can adduce grounds for these actions and with sophistication we can point to a respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice (7) . Wittgenstein makes the point several times that the process of justification must come to an end in order for it to be a justification (8, 9 In On Certainty (12) he says, 'Giving grounds ... justifying the evidence, comes to an end; -but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, ie, it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game'. Johnston (13) puts it thus: '... in understanding human action one eventually reaches the bedrock of a reaction, for at some point the giving of reasons comes to an end, and we are faced with the fact that the individual acted as he did'. Again, Wittgenstein (14) says that the end of giving grounds 'is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting'. In the same work (15) (16) and as such cannot be justified (17) . He says, 'What has to be accepted, the given, is -so one could say -forms of life' (18 ' Rather, in this context the claim to truth or objectivity expresses the claim that one set of judgements about how people should act is uniquely correct and that the standards embodied in these judgements ought to be recognized by everyone just because this is so' (32) . Alternatively, subjectivism would involve a person in the substantive claim that moral disagreements were simply disputes over matters of taste. Wittgenstein's discussion suggests that '... disagreement is not merely verbal but very real -it reflects the conflict between two ways of understanding the world and correspondingly two different ways of acting' (33) . Subjectivism seems to miss the point about ethics: that matters of taste are in no way equivalent to matters of absolute value. Rush Rhees (34) uses the example of a man playing tennis badly who might say 'I don't want to play any better', which might reasonably be accepted. But where someone has behaved badly it would not make sense to accept a similar excuse, 'I don't want to behave any better', because a person ought to want to behave better.
The argument from experience Thirdly, to revert to the relevance of our comments from Wittgenstein to medical ethics, it could be argued that Wittgenstein's account of justification is more realistic than pictures often presented by ethical theories. His account squares with our experience of ethical decisions and thereby narrows the spectre of a chasm between armchair philosophy and practical decisions, which have to be made on our feet! A fifteen-year-old girl comes to see me seeking termination of her pregnancy but does not want her parents informed. In deciding what is morally correct, do I feel as if I apply a felicific calculus to maximize happiness? Do I quickly think of autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-maleficence? I
would suggest that what it actually feels like is that I just act: 'This is simply what I do'. Now, clearly, I can be accused of misunderstanding the philosophical point: 'critical evaluation' may occur later, should have occurred sooner, but whenever it occurs, may well require utilitarian and other notions. I question, however, whether this textbook type of ratiocination usually, if ever, occurs in the real world. Of course, it can. We can persuade ourselves that by telling (or not telling) her parents we were acting with justice and non-maleficence, or some other concoction of the preferred formulation. Does this, however, really satisfy our craving for ultimiiate justification? To make the point in a pseudoanti-intellectual way, the textbook may proffer a justification to satisfy ' Even if we do use 'textbook' justificatory arguments, if they satisfy us it is likely to be because they are in accord with an underlying reality ('the given') about human beings as such. So my point is not anti-intellectual; it is rather the demand that we should dig deeper until the spade is turned. But it is also the suggestion that the most vital critical evaluation to take place is that which measures this particular action against my other actions and beliefs.
Wittgenstein (35) similarly writes: 'Nothing we do can be defended absolutely and finally. But only by reference to something else that is not questioned. le, no reason can be given why you should act (or should have acted) like this, except that by doing so you bring about such and such a situation, which again has to be an aim you accept'. Several points arise from this quotation. Wittgenstein implies that the absolute defence of an action comes from its relationship to another action which is just accepted. His thrust is that there must be something which is not questioned. This bedrock would provide the basis for absolutes in ethics. Now, this links with the point I am making at present, that the notion of checking our actions against our other actions and beliefs is much more like what we really do in practical philosophy. These 'other actions and beliefs' have to be things which are not questioned. Or, if they are, they are likely to be held in place by further unquestioned actions and beliefs, so that the whole conmplex of actions and beliefs may acquire a self-supporting nature (which is only intended as a metaphor). My particular complex reflects and constitutes my particular nature, which may be vicious or virtuous.
Moreover, it is from this nature that my actions emanate. I am aware of nothing but that when I reply to the fifteen-year-old girl, not of ratiocinations usually described in philosophical medical ethics. This awareness is by no means irrelevant to a true understanding of medical ethics. This is not, it must be emphasized, an argument against critical evaluation, but it is an argument from experience. As Johnston (36) says: '... the basis of moral belief is not specific evidence but ... the entirety of the individual's experience'. Or again (37) , if one's viewpoint is grounded in anything it is in 'all the individual has seen, thought, and experienced'. This description more readily squares with the experience of making decisions of a moral nature.
Moral arguments
The fourth way in which Wittgensteinian notions are relevant to medical ethics concerns moral arguments. In disagreements we point out to our opponents things which they accept but which are at odds with the thing in question. We, as it were, point out irregularities in their particular systems of beliefs. In arguments the presupposition is that irregularities should be made regular, that the systems of beliefs should even come to resemble, more or less, each other.
The corollary would then be that there exists, in theory, a perfect system of beliefs, a perfect complex, shown in our human natures, if we could but hone it down by frank argument and honest evaluation. This may amount to no more than persuasion to look at things in a particular way; like Wittgenstein (38) saying: 'At the end of reasons comes persuasion'. Ethical arguments need not be taken any less seriously if we candidly accept that at root they are a matter of persuasion; the strength of our belief in our world view determines our seriousness.
Johnston (39) highlights that whilst moral discussion is possible the notion of bedrock means that it may end in irresolvable disagreement. Again, this is the experience of arguments in medical ethics, abortion being an obvious example. New facts do not seem to help much. The irresolvable nature of the disputes stems from the nature of ethical beliefs. Nevertheless, cases may be compared to look for morally relevant differences. For it remains important that there is consistency in ethics and it is in inconsistency that persuasion may gain a purchase. Accepting that there may be irresolvable disagreements does not commit us to subjectivism; if anything, it stems from a recognition of the nature of moral judgements qua judgements, as opposed to mere dispositions or preferences which lack the feeling of immutability required for a thing to have a specifically moral character.
Given that moral arguments are grounded in the human being as such it follows that anything pertaining to the human being might well be relevant in these arguments: 'anything that one person can tell another which will lead him to change his way of seeing the world or alter his sense of right and wrong constitutes a possible form of a moral argument' (36) . To 
Teaching medicine and ethics
Regarding ethical arguments in this light has implications for teaching medicine, which is a final reason why Wittgenstein's comments have a bearing on medical ethics. For one thing, if medical ethics is mainly concerned with human beings as such, then doctors require as wide an understanding of human nature as possible. This will not be provided best by specialising solely in the sciences, no matter how important these are, but will be aided by studying the humanities.
Moreover, medical ethics is not just a matter of learning different ethical theories, like learning more facts or a new language. On the view expressed here it is certainly not about accepting different opinions as being equally valid as one's own. It is about having and holding a worldview and trying to persuade others to see the world in our way, whilst acknowledging the similarly strongly held views of our opponents. This acknowledgement is a matter both of courtesy and of practical wisdom; we refine our views by exposure to the world. Our views may change. This is not precluded, since the notion of ethics advocated entails that someone is wrong. At least, by public scrutiny of our views, we may achieve more clarity.
Teaching medical ethics becomes a process of clarification, not just one of sophistication for previously glibly held views. Medical ethics should provide an overview of the full implications of any particular medical decision for how we 'think and live'. This extends even to our attitude towards the patient as a human being. I think it explains Wittgenstein's advice to his former pupil and friend Drury (42) , who felt inadequate as a newly qualified doctor: 'Look at your patients more closely as human beings in trouble and enjoy more the opportunity you have to say "good night" to so many people. This alone is a gift from heaven which many people would envy you ... I think in some sense you don't look at people's faces closely enough'.
